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The purpose of this paper is to test an international oil and gas market model, hypothesised to 
arrive at new indicator of pure composite political risk for country oil and gas sectors. 
Current political risk ratings are largely subjectively quantified and are not frequently 
published. Investors in oil and gas industry portfolios as well as trade and investment policy 
formulators should be interested that there is a strong theoretical and practical basis where 
pure political risk indicators may be obtained daily rather than monthly using stock market 
generated data. A systemic international capital asset pricing model is a useful framework as 
long as available financial and economic information is captured along with systemic 
interdependence and control introduced for country size and wealth effects. If so, an 
indication of the influence of human (political) factors in each country oil and gas industry 
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Introduction 
Studies into energy crises in recent years has focussed on largely global economic and 
financial factors and to a lesser extent on the inhibition of the free interplay of supply and 
demand of commodities, such as oil, through cartel pricing behaviour. The impact of pure 
political risk on energy markets has also been neglected. Pure composite political risk, 
according to risk ratings agencies, is described as the late fulfilment of international 
obligations by a country due to political factors (such as riots, strikes and civil unrest) and 
influenced by human and cultural factors (such as corruption, history of law and order and 
quality of bureaucracy). The components of pure composite political risk according to ICRG 
(2010) are contained in Appendix 1. 
The central hypothesis of this study is that the risks to international oil and gas industry 
market sectors due to composite political factors may be indicated daily by the standard 
errors of regressions of adapted international oil and gas industry market pricing models after 
adjusting for country size and income effects2. The groups of countries have different 
economic positions in gross domestic product and populations and the final analysis of this 
study will require an adjustment of standard errors of market models to include the latest 
statistics for each country banking market in per capita income. Purchasing power parity is 
used so that control may be introduced for the relative cost of living and inflation rates of the 
sampled countries rather than simply the exchange rate. The exchange rate alone may not 
account for real difference in income between bank countries. 
In each oil and gas industry market, the basic market model controls for country global 
economic conditions (using country and global stock market price indices) and for global oil 
and gas industry market conditions (using a global oil and gas industry price index). In 
summary, the purpose of this paper is to provide the framework for the calculation of a daily 
composite political risk indicator for international oil and gas industry sectors. Support for 
these issues will be provided if the residual series of the market models behave in a similar 
way to country political risk ratings in a stochastic sense and if the adjusted standard errors of 
these models (according to per capita income and domestic stock market effects) demonstrate 
a similar ranking to political risk ratings. 
Theory and literature 
Financial economic theory, drawing specifically from portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1959), the 
theory of the capital asset pricing model or CAPM (Sharpe, 1964; Ross, 1976; Roll, 1977, 
                                                 
2 The basic model appears in a book chapter by Simpson (2009). 
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Fama and French,1992) and the efficient market hypothesis of EMH (Fama, 19703) provide 
the theoretical base for the study. Arbitrage pricing theory based on the CAPM (Roll, 1977), 
is particularly relevant when extended to an international context in an international capital 
asset pricing model for country oil and gas industry markets. Systematic or quantifiable 
(expected) components of the model are economic and financial in nature and the 
unsystematic (unexpected) component is country specific. The latter element is therefore 
reflective of human behaviour in a country’s political system, which in turn is affected by 
social, legal and cultural factors in that country.  
The literature review draws on substantive evidence of significant relationships between 
economic and financial information and sovereign risk, country risk and political risk (For 
example, Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986 (Footnote 2); Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich, 1992 
(Footnote 2); Maltosky and Lianto, 19954; Cantor and Packer, 19965; Erb, Harvey and 
Viskanta, 19966; Diamonte, Liew and Stevens, 19967; Hill, 19988; Radelet and Sachs, 19989;  
Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz, 199910; Reisen and von Maltzan, 199911; Hooper and Heaney, 200112; 
Brooks, Faff, Hillier and Hillier, 200413; Hooper, Hume and Kim, 200414;  Busse and 
                                                 
3 Security markets can be tested for informational efficiency at three levels. They are weak-form efficient if 
stock prices  and/or returns are a random walk, semi-strong-form efficient if stock prices and/or returns 
immediately reflect all available public information and they are strong-form efficient if stock prices and/or 
returns reflect all public and private information. 
4 Sovereign risk rating downgrades are informative to equity markets, but upgrades do not supply markets with 
new information. 
5 Sovereign risk ratings had a significant impact on bond yield spreads. 
6 Country risk measures are correlated with future equity returns but financial risk measures reflect greater 
information. They also found that country risk measures are also highly correlated with country equity valuation 
measures and that country equity value oriented strategies generated higher returns.   
7 Country risk represents a more important determinant of stock returns in emerging rather than in developed 
markets. They also found that over the past 10 years country risk had decreased in emerging markets and 
increased in developed markets. They speculated that if that trend continued the differential impacts of country 
risks in each of those markets would narrow. 
8 In times of crisis many investors may be determined to minimise exposure to securities affected by country 
risk until they have more information, but after a period of calm the spreads being offered appear to be too high 
relative to the risks. After more investors return to the market the spreads get less and when there is another 
crisis the cycle recommences.  
9 Country/sovereign risk ratings agencies were too slow to react to crises and when they did react it was 
suggested that their ratings intensified and prolonged the crisis. 
10 Ratings agencies behaved in a pro-cyclical manner by upgrading country/sovereign risk ratings during boom 
times and downgrading them during crises. 
11 Ratings agencies exacerbated boom-bust cycles in financial markets and put emerging markets at greater risk.   
12 Concluded that multi index models should be tested that incorporate a regional index, an economic 
development attribute, commodity factors and a political risk variable in order to more effectively price 
securities. 
13 Equity market responses to country/sovereign risk ratings changes revealed significant responses following 
downgrades. 
14 Ratings agencies provided stock markets and foreign exchange markets in the United States with new 
tradeable information. Ratings upgrades increased stock markets returns and decreased volatility significantly. 
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Hefeker, 200515; Simpson, 2007, 2007a16). Most researchers (except for example, Busse and 
Hefeker (2004) and Simpson (2007, 2007a) examine country and sovereign risk ratings rather 
than pure political risk ratings.  
However, most evidence indicates that country/sovereign risk (which includes pure political 
risk) has a significant relationship with stock market price changes. These price changes 
include those of the important oil and gas industry sector. It should be noted that some 
evidence is produced that indicates that financial crises refected in reduced stock market price 
changes are the main influences on sovereign risk ratings. If this is the case, and if this is also 
applicable to various country oil and gas industry markets, risk ratings agencies cannot 
contribute new information to oil and gas industry markets for investors and nor could they 
be useful to government policy makers.  
Many multifactor models may not be firmly founded in capital market or economic theory 
and there are many different specifications (Reilly & Brown, 2003). Ultimately, if political, 
social, legal and cultural factors are to be taken into account in a model of country stock 
market price changes, it is necessary to assume that they are incorporated in such a basic 
market model. This avoids the myriad of problems encountered in more advanced versions of 
the CAPM or the APT or the multifactor models. Reilly and Brown (2003) imply that it is 
feasible to apply a basic market model to a financial system using systemic stock price index 
data provided the constituents of the indices used are representative of the industry in the 
country concerned.  
Global interdependence of country stock markets (and, it is herewith suggested, country oil 
and gas industry sectors) may produce spill-over effects. Researchers that have studied stock 
market spillovers are many, but include Baig and Goldfajn (1998), Forbes and Rigobon 
(1999), Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001), Caporale, Cipollini and Spagnolo (2003), 
Rigobon (2004) and also currency market literature in Ellis and Lewis (2000). This literature 
has focused on the manifestation of financial contagion. The study in this paper controls for 
global oil and gas industry and stock market effects on different oil and gas industry markets 
and interdependence in these sectors will be examined using VAR based cointegration tests. 
This analysis emphasises an important aspect of regression errors. The error term of a basic 
market model, according to portfolio theory, is an indicator of unsystematic risk. This 
component of total risk, in a systemic international market model, is the diversifiable 
                                                 
15 Government stability, the absence of internal conflicts and ethnic tensions, basic democratic rights and the 
ensuring of law and order are highly significant determinants of foreign investment flows. 
16 Evidence of the direct adverse effects of extreme political acts on industries and economies is provided and 
cited. 
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component and it encapsulates country specific factors as well as other factors such as natural 
disasters. Control cannot be introduced into the model for the latter group of factors, 
however, the former country specific factors, by definition, includes difficult to measure 
human and legal factors that impact political risk and these factors can be captured as a 
composite group. Essentially, the lower the adjusted standard errors of the oil and gas market 
models, the lower the political risk. This is because the lower errors reflect lower 
unsystematic risk, and it suggested that a major component of unsystematic risk is country 
specific political risk. 
The model, method and data 
 
Political risk is largely composed of legal differences between countries and that these 
differences are impacted by other human factors relating to social and cultural environments. 
The model that follows cannot control for the various components of pure political risk (such 
as corruption, quality of bureaucracy, history of law and order etc). However, the model 
recognises that there is a composite political risk value that is comprised of all of these 
human and legal components. Political news good or bad arrives randomly. If daily data are 
examined, models must attempt to provide daily composite political risk indication. They do 
not do this at present where ratings are reported at best, monthly.  
An international oil and gas sector capital assets pricing model is specified and expanded to 
control for the interaction of that a country oil and gas sector with the global oil and gas 
industry markets and global stock markets. According to CAPM theory, adapted for a country 
oil and gas sector, all economic and financial influences are captured in the regression 
intercept and its coefficients. All country specific and therefore all human, social, cultural, 
legal and political influences (which collectively make up composite political risk) on the 
country oil and gas industry are captured in the unsystematic risk component. That is, in the 
error term of the regression. The basic international capital asset pricing model is expanded to 
be assumed to be applicable to an industry sector rather than a firm within that sector and 
brings in international influences.  
The oil and gas industry sectors of 5 countries are examined (2 developed countries and 3 
developing countries). Countries selected for the sample are selected as examples of both 
developed and developing countries (the latter group contains those countries that are 
undergoing the process of globalisation of their stock markets and industrial sectors). 
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The daily data for each country, for global oil and gas industry and stock markets are 
obtained from representative indices published by DataStream for the period 31/12/1999 to 
3/2/2010.  
Monthly composite political risk ratings are extracted from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG, 2009) for the period October 2000 to November 2008 with the period of study 
reduced due to missing political risk values. Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Philips 
Perron (PP) tests need to be run on prices and first differences (price changes) to confirm 
non-stationarity of levels and stationarity of first differences. Whilst problems with skewness 
and kurtosis created distributions that are neither uniform nor normal (according to Jarques 
Bera tests), unit root tests show that the level series are non-stationary and the first difference 
series and errors of the related first difference regressions are stationary. The series are thus 
integrated non-stationary processes. 
Step 1 
The first step is the specification of a basic international country oil and gas industry price 
market model of unlagged prices for each country oil and gas industry sector as follows:  
tiGSGEtiE ePPP ttt  )(2)(1                                          1) 
Where; 
tiE
P is the price on a country’s oil and gas industry share price index i at time t. 
tGE
P is the price on the global oil and gas industry index at time t. 
tGS




 ’s are the regression coefficients representing the proportion of systematic or 
market risk in country oil and gas industry sector i at time t. 
ti
e is the error term of the regression indicating the unsystematic risk in the country oil and 
gas industry sector i at time t.  
Heteroskedasticity is persistent. This could be controlled for by the specification of a 
generalised least squares regression or an autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
model. The major purpose, however, is to firstly capture the errors in level series so that these 
may be stochastically compared to level series pure political risk ratings. For ease of analysis 
and for the purposes in demonstrating the stochastic relationship between level series 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression errors and political risk ratings, this study utilises 




The daily residuals of Equation 1) are converted to monthly average residuals to compare 
with monthly political risk ratings for the period October 2000 to November 2008. The 
sample period covered in Equation 1) on daily data is reduced by a few months to 
accommodate missing values of political risk ratings. According to the main hypothesis of the 
study the errors of the international market model will behave in a similar fashion to pure 
composite political risk scores. For the purposes of this study it is deemed necessary to treat 
lower political risk country systems as having a lower risk score. The ratings agencies treat 
higher scores as being associated with lower risk and the risk scores are in a scale of 1 to 100. 
The raw risk score in this study is deducted from 100 so that a lower score represents lower 
political risk.  
It is important to note that the first differences of the residuals of the oil and gas market 
models, the political risk ratings and the errors of that regression are demonstrated to be 
stationary, according to ADF and PP tests. It is clear that these are integrated non-stationary 
processes. If these series are cointegrated, support is lent to the hypothesis that the level 
series regression errors may be used in a VAR model to calculate and adapt the standard 
errors of that relationship to provide a new political risk indicator. Standard errors of the 
relationship between the international market model residuals (adapted for country size and 
wealth effects and country stock market effects) might be considered a proxy for composite 
political risk ratings. But, prior to this a series of market model regression errors need to be 
compared to political risk ratings. The following is the model to be used to test the central 
hypothesis. 
tttiti
iiOGOG ePRE  )(                                                                                          2) 
Where is the error of the level series regression in Equation 1) for country i at time t and 





The purpose of specifying this equation is to compare the stochastic relationship between the 
errors of the daily level series market models for each country oil and gas sector converted to 
monthly series (the average residual for each month) to the monthly level series risk ratings. 
If the errors terms of Equation 2) are stationary it may give an indication of cointegration of 
the series of market model regression errors and political risk ratings. Unit root tests in 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips Peron (PP) are utilised to test the stationarity of 
the errors of Equation 2). The stronger tests of the strength of that relationship are carried out 
using a vector autoregressive model (VAR) and VAR based tests of cointegration. Equation 
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2) is respecified into a VAR with both variables in Equation 2), optimally lagged according to 
various information criteria. If the cointegration tests are positive and if the VAR has a strong 
explanatory power in adjusted R Squared statistics, then the variables are demonstrated to 
behave in a similar stochastic fashion. This is because the series will have been proven to 
exhibit similar trends in variability and will together achieve equilibrium at some point in the 
long-term. The explanatory power of the VAR model is a test of the strength of the 
relationship. 
Step 3 
If the adjusted R Square value in the VAR is high and if cointegration is demonstrated it is 
clear that the oil and gas market model residual and the political risk ratings are related. The 
final part of the analysis is to adjust the standard errors (rather than raw regression errors) of 
each country oil and gas market model for differences in per capita income in the first stage 
and then for the country domestic stock market effects in the second stage. The per capita 
income numbers are extracted from International Monetary Fund (2009) calculations for 
countries of the world sorted by gross domestic product at purchasing power parity per 
capita. The adjusted standard errors in each stage are then ranked and compared to the 
rankings of the mean political risk scores for each country. If the rankings are similar then the 
illustration of the proxy for political risk will lie in the adjusted standard errors of the country 
oil and gas market regressions. 
Findings 
Step 1 
Table 1 illustrates the findings from the Equation 1) regressions for each country oil and gas 
industry stock market sector in the sample of countries selected.  
Table 1 
Regressions of country oil and gas market sectors in level series 
Country Adjusted R 
Square Value 





Error of level 
series 
regression  







Significant  Variables 
Australia 0.968 (2) 135.676 0.057/2.296 Oil and gas world index and 
world stock market index 
Canada 0.957 (3) 105.937 0.014/2.297 “  ” 
China 0.886 (5) 48.907 0.121/2.212 “   “ 
India 0.860 (6) 58.852 0.014/1.742 “   “ 
Malaysia 0.789 (7) 75.943 0.009/2.066 “   “ 
 
Note: Significance levels are at 1%. 
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The results initially indicate strong explanatory power, but according to the DW statistic the 
results are spurious due to significant serial correlation in the errors of the regressions.  First 
differencing of all variables in the market models removes serial correlation, but substantially 
reduces the explanatory power of the model. However, it is the level series regression 
information that is used in this study. The purpose of running and reporting the results in the 
level series regression is to capture the level residuals as a series and to show the regression 
standard errors, which are later to be adjusted and compared to political risk ratings in the 
final part of the analysis. 
Step 2 
The daily errors or regression residuals from Equation 1) for each country oil and gas market 
are captured in a series. These are then converted to a monthly series in order to compare to 
pure composite political risk ratings, which are only available monthly. Political risk ratings 
are amended prior to the analysis to show that the lower the risk rating (out of 100), the lower 
the composite political risk. Higher regression errors (higher levels of country specific or 
unsystematic risk) are associated with higher pure composite political risk. Due to missing 
values of the political risk ratings the sample period for the monthly data is reduced to 
include the period October 2000 to November 2008.  
Table 2 summarises the results of the unit root tests for the level series regression errors for 
Equation 2) and political risk ratings when the former are converted to monthly series. 
Table 2 
Unit root tests for variables of oil and gas market model from Equation 2) in level series 
and in monthly data 
 
Country Market model residual 
ti
OGE  


















































Note: Results are shown as ADF/PP tests with probabilities in parenthesis. The critical values of the ADF/PP test statistics are 1% at 
-3.499. 5% at -2.892 and, 10% at -2.583. 
 
 
Both the monthly level series market model residual and the level series political risk rating 
variables are for the most part non-stationary ( except for the Australian political risk 
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variable, which  is stationary at the 5% level and the Canadian market model residual, which 
is stationary at the 1% level). First differencing of the errors of Equation 2) convert those 
series to stationarity at the 1% level.  It is evident that for the greater part, as highlighted in 
the Table, the level series are integrated non-stationary processes and the application the level 
series in a VAR, based on optimally lagged variables in Equation 2), is feasible in order to 
test for cointegration and causality. 
The VAR stability condition check is run for all country oil and gas markets and shows that 
the VARs are stable (no root lies outside the unit circle). The results of the VAR and of the 
VAR based cointegration and causality tests are shown in Table 3 
Table 3 
Results of VAR and VAR based cointegration and causality tests  
 
Country Adjusted R 
Square: With 
the residual 
series of the 
























Causality over 4 lags 
according to VAR based 
Granger tests 
Australia 0.909 1 according to 
FPE, AIC, SC 
and HQ  
1 at the 5% 
level of 
significance 
No evidence of dual or one-
way causality at the 10% level 
of significance. 
Canada 0.870 1 according to 
FPE, AIC, SC 
and HQ 
2 at the 5% 
level of 
significance 
No evidence of dual or one-
way causality at the 10% level 
of significance 
China 0.860 1 according to 
FPE, AIC, SC 
and HQ 
2 at the 5% 
level of 
significance 
No evidence of dual or one-
way causality at the 10% level 
of significance 
India 0.978 “   “    “    “ 1 at the 5% 
level of 
significance 
One way causality is 
significant at the 5% level 
where political risk ratings for 
India Granger cause the Indian 
oil and Gas market regression 
errors. 
Malaysia 0.897 1 according to 
LR, FPE, AIC, 
SC and HQ 
2 at the 5% 
level of 
significance 
No evidence of dual or one-
way Granger causality at the 
10% level. 
 
Note: LR is the likelihood ratio. FPE is final prediction error, AIC is Akaike information criteria. SC and HQ are Schwartz and 
Hannan Quinn information criteria. 
 
It is evident from these results that the residual series from the market model and the political 
risk ratings series are related through cointegration. They have similar stochastic trends and 
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come to stability together in the long-term. Appendix 2 provides a graphical representation of 
the movement of the errors when each variable is treated endogenously. There is no 
significant evidence at any level of dual or one-way causality according to VAR based 
Granger tests run over lags up to 4 months. 
Step 3 
As the final step in this analysis the standard errors (reported in Table 1, but based on the raw 
market model residuals) are adjusted according to size and wealth affects in each country and 
compared to the mean political risk ratings for each country. If there is a similar ranking in 
the adjusted standard errors to the ranking of the mean political risk ratings there may be 
some basis for saying that these adjusted standard errors of international oil and gas market 
models are an indicator of country political risk. Lower values of the adjusted standard error 
would represent lower political risk because the unsystematic component (comprised to a 
large extent of political risk) is lower.   
Per capita income levels are shown in Table 4. These levels are divided into the standard 
errors (to adjust the errors for country size and wealth effects).  
Table 4 
Level (ranking) Per capita income range $ 
8 (1) 35,000 to 40,000 
7 (2) 30,000 to 35,000 
6 (3) 25,000 to 30,000 
5 (4) 20,000 to 25,000 
4 (5) 15,000 to 20,000 
3 (6)  10,000 to 15,000 
2 (7)  5,000 to 10,000 
1 (8) 0 to 5,000 
 
Note: The ranking of each country in terms of the level of per capita income is provided in parenthesis. 
 
The results of this brief analysis are shown in Table 5. The levels in Table 5 are divided into 
the standard errors in Table 6 to adjust the standard errors and to provide a ranking of 
























income in USD 
(per capita 







Political risk ratings 




Australia 135.676 37,302 (8) 16.960 (2) 12.743 (1) 
Canada 105.937 38,290 (8) 13.242 (1) 13.015 (2) 
 Malaysia 75.943 13,551 (3) 25.314 (4) 26.208(3) 
China 48.907 6,546  (2) 24.454 (3) 32.188 (4) 
India  58.852 2,932 (1) 58.852 (5) 39.446 (5) 
 
Note: For example, 8 represents the highest level of per capita income of $35,000 to $40,000. This category includes Australia and 
Canada whose standard errors are divided by 8.  Australia’s standard error of 135.676 in Column 2 is divided by 8 to obtain an 
adjusted standard error of 12.743 in Column 3.  
 
 
Note that the rankings for per capita income are slightly different to the rankings of political 
risk. Australia and Canada are similar countries with similar economic positions. Both are 
developed countries with well established physical and commercial infrastructures.  Malaysia 
and China rankings are also different to the political risk ratings rankings. It is evident that 
the developing countries of Malaysia, China and India rank below the developed countries of 
Australia and Canada in standard errors rankings, recalling that the higher the adjusted error, 
the higher the political risk in the various oil and gas markets. 
Step 4 
Equation 1) in this study has served its purpose in demonstrating that the level series errors of 
the international market model behave stochastically in a similar manner to political risk 
ratings. The adjusted standard errors of that model demonstrate that developed countries and 
developing countries have similar rankings when compared to the rankings for political risk. 
However, it is clear that the rankings are not exactly the same and control must be introduced 
for the country domestic stock market effects. In order to provide this, a domestic oil and gas 
market model (which includes the country stock market index) needs to be combined with the 
international market model and specified in first differences to remove problems of serial 
correlation. The combined market model to be studied is as follows, where  represent 





OGWSWsOG PPPfP  ,,( ) 
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The standard errors of these relationships in each country oil and gas market may then be 
adjusted according the per capita income effects fin each country. The results of this 
regression are as follows in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Results of regression of combined oil and gas market models with standard errors, 




































Australia 0.141 2.295 29.084 1 29.084 (2) 12.743 (1) 
Canada 0.637 2.298 12.610 1 12.610 (1) 13.015 (2) 
 Malaysia 0.025 2.064 5.894 6 35.364 (3) 26.208(3) 
China 0.132 2.210 6.683 7 46.781 (4) 32.188 (4) 
India  0.106 1.743 6.586 8 52.688 (5) 39.446 (5) 
 
Note: The ranking of country per capita income in column 5 is multiplied by the standard error in column 4 to arrive at the 
adjusted standard error in column 6. 
 
These results show that serial correlation problems in the errors have been removed 
according to DW tests. The adjusted R square values are not particularly high but they are 
significant at the 1% level. In each case (except for China) the statistically significant 
explanatory variable is the global oil and gas market (significant at the 1% level in each 
country oil and gas market system), with the domestic stock market and the world stock 
market not statistically significant at any level. In the case of China, the Chinese stock market 
variable is significant at the 5% level, the global oil and gas market variable is significant at 
the 1% level and the world stock market variable is not significant at any level. 
With this final step stronger evidence is now provided that ranks the adjusted errors of the 
combined domestic and international market model in a similar ranking to the country 
political risk ratings with the only exception being the ranking of Australia and Canada where 
Australia is ranked 2 and Canada ranked 1.  Tit is put forward that evidence is produced 
herewith that supports the hypothesis that standard errors of market models can reflect 
political risk ratings if the standard errors are adjusted for domestic market effects and per 
capita income effects. The lower the adjusted standard errors, the lower the political risk. 
Limitations 
Further research is needed to lend greater support for the central hypothesis. A more 
comprehensive list of countries needs to be included in the empirical investigation and 
market data. It is demonstrated that whilst the international model is needed in level series to 
capture level series regression errors to compare to political risk ratings after adjustment it 
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would be better to also run a regression of a combined market model in first differences to 
remove serial correlation problems and incorporate domestic stock market effects along with 
per capita income effects. 
Conclusion 
This paper set out to provide, based on financial economics theory and evidence, support for 
the hypothesis that systemic international oil and gas market models can indicate pure 
composite political risk that impact the oil and gas sector, using daily stock market generated 
data. It is suggested that this information is useful to investors in portfolios of oil stocks and 
trade and investment policy makers because at present political risk ratings are largely 
subjectively quantified and are infrequently published. The sample of countries chosen to test 
the central hypothesis contains 2 developed countries and 3 developing and transitional 
economies. 
The first step in the analysis was to specify international market models for each country oil 
and gas sector. Following this the residuals for each market model were collected in a daily 
series, but then converted to a monthly series to compare that variable to monthly political 
risk ratings. These now monthly variables and the errors of a regression of those variables 
were again tested for non-stationarity and stationarity in the latter case, to demonstrate that 
the processes were integrated and non-stationary and to ensure they could be made to interact 
in a VAR. The study then moved to run VAR based tests of cointegration and causality.  
The study has provided support for the notion that the residual of the international market 
model for each oil and gas market studied possesses similar stochastic trends to the political 
risk ratings and together these variables achieve equilibrium in the long-term. The 
explanatory power of the respective VARs in the adjusted R Square value is high. In relation 
to short-term dynamics on lags of up to 4 months, there is no evidence of significant dual or 
one-way causality at any level in any of the country oil and gas systems studied. The rankings 
of the standard residuals from the oil and gas market model regressions, after they are 
adjusted to take account of country size and wealth effects, is not dissimilar to the country 
political risk rankings. When a final step is taken to incorporate domestic stock market effects 
into a combined domestic and international market model in first differences the results are 
more favourable with the standard errors of that relationship, after adjustment for per capita 
income, showing and even closer ranking of the adjusted errors to the political risk ratings 
rankings. 
The conclusion is that an analysis of daily international stock and oil and gas market data for 
each country market can reveal a daily indication of pure composite political risk. Future 
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research will combine domestic and international market models with first differences 
applied to capture the standard errors. Level series VARs will continue to be run using the 
captured level series regression errors to compare to level series political risk ratings in order 
to run VAR based tests of cointegration and causality. More research needs to be done, but 
initial results are encouraging and should be of interest to oil and gas market investors, trade 
and investment policy formulators and portfolio managers. This is because some of the 
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Definitions and explanations of pure political risk components (ICRG, 2005) 
 
Government stability ratings are an assessment of a government’s ability to remain in office by carrying out 
declared policy plans. The subcomponents of this factor are government unity, legislative strength and popular 
support. According to the ICRG ratings, socio-economic conditions relate to pressures that conspire to constrain 
government action or to fuel social dissatisfaction. The subcomponents in this category are the level of 
unemployment, the degree of consumer confidence and the level of poverty.  
The investment profile factor affects the risk to investment not covered by other political, economic and 
financial components and is made up of contract viability and expropriation, profit repatriation, and payment 
delays.  
Internal conflict is an assessment of political violence in a country and its impact on governance. The highest 
rating means that there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the government does not engage in 
arbitrary violence (either direct or indirect) against its own people. Under this rationale the lowest scores would 
apply to those countries where there is ongoing civil war. The subcomponents of this risk factor are thus, civil 
war or coups threat, terrorism or political violence, and civil disorder. 
External conflict measures are an assessment of the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, 
which includes non-violent external pressure (for example, diplomatic pressure, withholding of aid, trade 
restrictions, territorial disputes, and sanctions) to violent external pressure (such as, cross-border disputes and 
all-out war).  The subcomponents of this category of pure political risk are cross-border conflict, and foreign 
pressures.  
Corruption is an internal assessment of the political system.  Corruption distorts the economic and financial 
environment and reduces the efficiency of government and business in the way the foreign direct investment is 
handled. Corrupt practices enable people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability. By 
so doing, an inherent instability is introduced into the political process. Examples of corruption include special 
financial payments and bribes, which ultimately may force the withdrawal of or withholding of a foreign 
investment. However, excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, “favour for favours”, secret party 
funding, and suspiciously close ties between government and business have a lot to do with corruption. A black 
market can be encouraged with these forms of corruption. The potential downside is that popular backlash may 
lead to the rendering of the country ungovernable. 
Military in politics is a problem because the military are not democratically elected. Their involvement in 
politics is thus a diminution of accountability. Other substantial ramifications are that the military becomes 
involved in government because of an actual or created internal or external threat. Government policy is then 
distorted (for example, defence budgets are increased at the expense of other pressing budgetary needs). 
Inappropriate policy changes may be a result of military blackmail. A full-scale military regime poses the 
greatest risk. Business risks may be reduced in the short-term but in the longer-term the risk will rise because 
the system of governance is susceptible to corruption and because armed opposition in the future is likely. In 
some cases, military participation will represent a symptom rather than a cause of higher political risk.  
Religious tensions emanate from the domination of society and or governance by a single religious group that 
seeks to replace civil law and order by religious law. Other religions are excluded from the political and social 
process. The risk involved in such scenarios involves inexperienced people dictating inappropriate policies 
through civil dissent to outright civil war. 
The law and order components are assessments of the strength and impartiality of the legal system and 
popular observance of the law respectively.  
Ethnic tensions relate to racial, nationality or language divisions where opposing groups are intolerant and 
unwilling to compromise. 
The democratic accountability component is a measure of how responsive government is to its people. The 
less responsive it is the greater the chance that the government will fall. This fall will be peaceful in a 
democratic country but possible violent in a non-democratic country. The institutional strength and the quality 
of the bureaucracy is a measure that reflects the revisions of policy when governments change. Low risk in this 
area applies to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without major changes 
in policy or interruptions in government services. That is, bureaucracies have a degree of autonomy from 






Graphs of endogenous residuals 
Note: Australian market model residual is AUSRESIDP, Australian Political risk is 
PRAUS.  For Canada, China, India and Malaysia the variables are denoted 
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